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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Rep. Vol. 9 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the Court below err in failing to direct a verdict against plaintiff on the 
issue of the proximate cause of her need for neck and wrist surgery owing to her failure 
to offer sufficient evidence of proximate cause to warrant submission of that question to 
the jury? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A denial of a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed by viewing the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party and will be sustained if reasonable minds could 
disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict. Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 Ut. 
104, 990P.2d933. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Darlene Beard was injured on September 15, 1996, at a Kmart store in 
Kearns, Utah, when she was struck in the head by the elbow of a Kmart employee as 
he was attempting to start a lawnmower. She was hit in the left side of the head and 
"seen a lot of stars". (R. 333, Trans. Vol. I., pg. 108). She felt herself falling and 
then felt something heavy on her hands. She was caught and doesn't know how far she 
fell (Id. at 109). She immediately suffered a terrible headache and pain in her knee and 
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ankle on the right side (Id. at 111). She became nauseated driving home and her hands 
hurt to drive (Id.). She went to the doctor the next day, complaining of head, neck, 
knee and foot pain and aching all over (Id. at 113). She testified that, thereafter, she 
continued to have severe headaches, a sore neck, aching hands, leg pain and foot pain 
(Id. at 115). 
She was ultimately seen by a number of physicians and underwent a number 
of different surgeries. Three of these surgeries, on her neck and both wrists, were 
performed by Dr. Robert Peterson (Id. at 125). 
Ms. Beard ultimately brought this action against Kmart, seeking damages for 
the negligence of the Kmart employee who struck her. At the close of the plaintiff's 
case, Kmart requested that the court below direct a verdict against plaintiff on the 
limited issue of whether she had presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find 
that her need for neck and wrist surgery was the proximate result of the injury she 
suffered at Kmart. (R. 334, Trans. Vol. II, pg. 424-26). The court denied the motion 
(Id. at 430), and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $431,290.22, 
including $76,058 in past economic damages and $250,000 in general damages. 
The evidence which would tend to support denial of Kmart's motion was 
plaintiffs own testimony that her neck and wrist problems had their onset with her 
injury at Kmart, that most of her treatment for neck problems began at the time of her 
injury at Kmart and that her treating physician indicated that there was a "chronologic 
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association" with the Kmart incident and her neck complaints. (R. 334, Trans. Vol. II, 
pg. 303). 
Defendant doesn't dispute that there was sufficient evidence on negligence 
and damage for this case to be presented to the jury. Its motion, and this appeal, are 
limited to the issue of whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to have the 
question of the proximate cause of her need for neck and back surgery submitted to the 
jury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As the causal relationship between an injury and the subsequent need for 
surgery is an issue requiring knowledge of medicine, a plaintiff alleging such a 
connection bears the burden of proving proximate cause and can only do so by 
presenting expert medical testimony establishing the probability of such a connection. 
In the absence of any medical testimony indicating a probability that the need for 
surgery resulted from the injury suffered from defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's 
allegation that it did is unsupported by the evidence, and the jury must be so instructed. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY DEMONSTRATING 
THAT DEFENDANTS NEGLIGENCE PROXIMATELY CAUSED 
PLAINTIFF'S NEED FOR SURGERY, IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
COURT BELOW TO SUBMIT THAT ISSUE TO THE JURY. 
Contrary to Ms. Beard's characterization of her neck problems essentially 
beginning at the time of her injury at Kmart, the evidence demonstrated that she had 
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received chiropractic care for problems with her neck, shoulder, arm and headaches off 
and on since at least 1981. (Exhibit P.5.) As of 1995, she was complaining of 
constant left arm pain and was diagnosed as possibly having thoracic outlet syndrome. 
In March of 1996, she described shoulder and neck aches for which she was receiving 
chiropractic care. (Exhibit P.5.) When examined by Dr. Prasad in January of 1997, 
she said she had suffered from back problems for 20 years and that for the last nine 
years she had been unable to engage in many activities because of "progressive wear 
and tear on her spine". (R. 334, Trans, at Vol. II, pg. 401.) 
While this would normally be the kind of evidence a defendant would use in 
an attempt to undercut a physician's opinion that the accident in question caused the 
need for plamtiff's subsequent surgery on her neck and wrists, in this case there was no 
need to challenge that opinion because it was never offered. 
Ms. Beard underwent carpal tunnel surgery on both wrists performed by Dr. 
Robert Peterson. At trial, Dr. Peterson candidly admitted that he had no opinion about 
any relationship between the incident at Kmart and Ms. Beard's subsequent need for 
carpal tunnel surgery. 
Q. You're not saying that if someone had a blow to the 
head, somehow she would have carpal tunnel 
because of trauma elsewhere to her body? 
A. I would say that would be very unlikely. 
Q. Okay. Less than probable. 
A. Less than probable. 
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Q. Okay. And so you're not telling the jury, again, to 
any degree of reasonable probability that her carpal 
tunnel was caused by this incident at Kmart; isn't 
that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
(R. at 334; Trans, at Vol. II, p. 316.) 
Dr. Peterson also performed neck surgery on Ms. Beard for a condition he 
described as a severe form of degenerative disc disease, which condition was present 
prior to the incident at Kmart. He made no attempt to attribute the cause of this 
condition to any trauma suffered in the Kmart incident and merely noted that Ms. Beard 
told him that her complaints started at that time. 
Q. You performed neck surgery on Darlene Beard 
because she had marginal osteophytes in the neck, 
bone spurs. 
A. That's essentially correct. 
Q. Those were pre-existing to September 15, 1996. 
A. That would be my best guess. 
Q. In fact, you termed, in your deposition, that as a 
severe form of degenerative disc disease; is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All of that was pre-existing long before this Kmart 
incident ever even happened? 
A. No argument. 
Q. Do you know how long? 
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A. Have no idea. 
Q. Do you know how they got there? 
A. As mentioned previous in testimony, it is essentially 
concomitant with being on a planet with gravity 
long enough. But it has to do with local irritation 
and other potential compromises such as trauma. 
Q. You don't know whether it was heredity, whether it 
was wear and tear, whether it was gravity — 
A. Absolutely no -
Q. — as to how those bone spurs got there. 
A. Absolutely no idea. 
Q. And you're not saying to the jury, to a degree of 
reasonable medical probability, that this incident at 
Kmart caused such a condition in her neck; isn't 
that correct? 
A. No, I'm not telling the jury that at all. 
Q. What did you see in the MRI before going into 
surgery? 
A. Bone spurs — osteophytes, primarily at C4-5, C5-6 
and C6-7. 
Q. All pre-existing --
A. Of course. 
Q. Before September 15th, 1996? 
A. Absolutely. 
(R. at 334, Trans. Vol. II, pp. 311-13.) 
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This testimony leaves the medical causation issue, as it relates to Ms. Beard's 
claim for recovery of damages associated with her carpal tunnel and cervical surgeries, 
totally a matter of speculation. As there was no medical testimony from a qualified 
expert establishing a probable connection between her injury at Kmart and her need for 
these surgeries, it was error for the trial court not to remove those issues from jury 
consideration. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Fitz v. Synthes, 1999 UT 103, 
990 P.2d 391, "medical expert testimony is required to prove proximate cause in a 
medical injury case". 1999 UT 103 at if 11. It has long been the law of this state that 
medical testimony establishing the mere possibility of a causal link between an accident 
and a particular injury is insufficient to allow jury consideration of that issue. 
For example, in Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rd. Co., 4 Utah 
2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 (1956), the plaintiff brought suit claiming damages for a ruptured 
disc in his back. A physician testified that in his opinion the plaintiff was suffering 
from a nerve irritation and it was possible that this was caused by his accident and that 
it was also possible this nerve irritation was due to a herniated disc. The defendant 
objected to testimony couched in terms of possibilities, which objection was overruled. 
Ultimately, defense counsel requested an instruction to the jury that plaintiff had failed 
to prove that he had a herniated disc. This fact was important because much of the 
doctor's testimony about the permanency of the plaintiffs injury rested on the premise 
that it was, in fact, a herniated disc. 
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It is, of course, possible that the jury in assessing the 
award considered merely the doctor's positive assertion 
of the existence of a "nerve irritation," but his testimony 
as to the permanence of disability was linked to the 
possibility of a disc injury and a discussion of disc 
injuries, including diagrams, occupied a considerable 
portion of evidence offered through him, thus impressing 
the jury with the seriousness of such a condition. Under 
these circumstances, if proof of such an injury falls short 
of that required under our law, then an instruction to that 
effect should have been given. 
292 P.2d at 850-51. 
The trial court refused to give such an instruction and the defendant appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that while it was not error to allow testimony couched in 
terms of medical possibilities, absent something more than such testimony, the jury 
cannot be allowed to speculate that the injury was, in fact, the one the doctor believed it 
might possibly be. 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff prayed for damages for a 
ruptured disc; the medical expert offered a learned and 
convincing discourse on ruptured discs; and some injury 
to the back was shown. The likelihood that the jury 
considered permanent injury as though it were proven by 
the expert testimony is strongly indicated and, therefore, 
an instruction should have been given to cure a possible 
prejudice. 
292P.2dat851. 
In the instant case, there is every reason to believe the jury treated Ms. 
Beard's need for surgery as though it were proven to have resulted from the Kmart 
accident because plaintiff's counsel expressly argued to them that they should award her 
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$200,000 in general damages because of her having undergone neck surgery and 
$30,000 for having to undergo wrist surgery on each wrist. (R. at 334; Trans. Vol. II, 
p. 470.) 
If the expert evidence offered on the issue of medical causation is simply that 
a particular injury could have resulted from a particular accident, but not that it 
probably did, such testimony is insufficient for submission of the issue to the jury. For 
example, in Denny v. St. Mark's Hospital 21 Utah 2d 189, 442 P.2d 944 (1968), the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict entered against the plaintiff in a case 
where it was held that there was insufficient evidence to permit the proximate cause 
issue to go to the jury. The Court noted that a physician's testimony that a traumatic 
event was one of a number of possible explanations for plaintiffs neck problems 
(which resulted in surgery for removal of a bone spur) was not enough to allow the jury 
to find that her injury was proximately caused by the event of which she was 
complaining. The Court specifically rejected the notion that the plaintiffs own 
testimony was a sufficient basis for a finding of medical causation. 
No lay witness can by the ordinary use of his senses say 
the complaints of the plaintiff, including the hurting in 
the back of her head, were caused by [defendant's 
conduct]. 
442 P.2d at 946. 
In the case of Ms. Beard, while she testified that her neck problems began at 
the time she was struck in the head at Kmart (though there was considerable evidence 
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to the contrary), her belief that her neck surgery was, therefore, the result of that 
incident cannot overcome the failure of the medical evidence to substantiate that belief. 
Dr. Peterson made it clear that the surgery he performed on her neck was to correct 
degenerative conditions which predated that episode. While he indicated that trauma 
could exacerbate these pre-existing conditions, he expressed no opinion that it likely 
did. 
With regard to Ms. Beard's need for carpal tunnel surgery on her wrists, no 
physician even suggested a causal connection with the Kmart episode. Accordingly, it 
was error for the trial court not to direct the jury, in arriving at their verdict, that Ms. 
Beard had failed to prove that the surgeries in question were caused by her injury at 
Kmart. 
If a plaintiff alleges that the need for a particular surgery was proximately 
caused by the defendant's negligence, she must establish this fact by competent expert 
testimony, as the causal relationship between a traumatic event and a subsequent 
surgery is a matter beyond the understanding of a lay juror. As stated by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals, in upholding a directed verdict removing an issue regarding the 
connection between a surgery and defendant's negligence from the jury, 
. . . no reasonable person could have found that the 
surgery in question was performed as a proximate result 
of the automobile accident in which Appellant was 
injured on November 18, 1992. A plaintiff has the 
burden of establishing proximate cause of an injury 
through the introduction of expert testimony which rises 
to the level of reasonable probability. Testimony 
10 
suggesting the mere possibility of a causal connection 
between an accident and an injury is not sufficient. 
685 N.E.2d 1294, 1295 (Ohio App. 1996). 
While the jury was entitled to believe Ms. Beard that her neck and hands 
were injured in the Kmart incident, such a finding in no way speaks to whether the 
subsequent surgeries she underwent were intended to remedy injuries so suffered. 
There was no medical testimony establishing any connection between the Kmart 
incident and Ms. Beard's need for carpel tunnel surgery. Dr. Peterson testified 
unequivocally that the neck surgery he performed was to deal with anatomical 
abnormalities which predated the Kmart accident. In the absence of any expert 
testimony establishing any probable causal relationship between her injuries at Kmart 
and the surgeries in question, it was error for the Court below to allow the jury to 
speculate about such a relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
While plaintiff unquestionably presented sufficient evidence to support a 
verdict finding she suffered damages as a result of Kmart's negligence, this appeal 
presents a far different question. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges that she suffered 
injuries necessitating the particular surgical treatment she received, that is an issue 
which requires proof on a medical subject which is beyond the competence of a jury to 
evaluate in the absence of expert medical testimony. When such testimony is lacking, 
the jury has no evidentiary basis upon which to resolve such issue in plaintiff's favor, 
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and plaintiff has failed, as a matter of law, to establish proximate cause as it relates to 
that question. Because the court failed to so instruct the jury in this case, the judgment 
entered on its verdict must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial on 
damages. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM 
No addendum is required. 
DATED this 24th day of May, 2000. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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